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2008 Edward A. Seegers Lecture
BALANCED REALISM ON JUDGING
Brian Z. Tamanaha*
I. INTRODUCTION
Perspectives on judging in the United States are dominated by a
story about the formalists and the realists.
According to this
conventional story, from the 1870s through the 1920s—the heyday of
legal formalism—lawyers and judges saw law as autonomous,
comprehensive, logically ordered, and determinate, and believed that
judges engaged in pure mechanical deduction from this body of law to
produce a single correct answer in each case. In the 1920s and 1930s,
building upon the insights of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound,
and Benjamin Cardozo—the story goes—the legal realists thoroughly
discredited legal formalism, demonstrating that the law is filled with
gaps and contradictions, that the law is indeterminate, that there are
exceptions for most every legal rule or principle, and that legal principles
and precedents can support opposite results. The realists argued that
judges decide according to their personal preferences then construct
their legal analysis to justify the desired outcome. This is the standard
chronicle, repeated numerous times by legal historians, political
scientists who study courts, legal theorists, and many others in the
American legal culture. A book on judging by three political scientists
lays out this account:
Until the twentieth century, most lawyers and scholars
believed that judging was a mechanistic enterprise in
which judges applied the law and rendered decisions
without recourse to their own ideological or policy
preferences . . . . In the 1920s, however, a group of
jurists and legal philosophers, known collectively as
“legal realists,” recognized that judicial discretion was
quite broad and that often the law did not mandate a
particular result.1

Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. This Lecture is based upon
my BEYOND THE FORMALIST REALIST DIVIDE: THE RULE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010). I
thank Princeton University Press for allowing me to reuse the material.
1
VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, ET AL., JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT 30 (2006) (emphasis
added).
*
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Similarly, a legal historian writes that
[f]ormalist judges of the 1895-1937 period assumed that
law was objective, unchanging, extrinsic to the social
climate, and, above all, different from and superior to
politics. . . . The Legal Realists of the 1920s and 1930s,
tutored by Holmes, Pound, and Cardozo, devastated
these assumptions. . . . They sought to weaken, if not
dissolve, the law-politics dichotomy, by showing that
the act of judging was not impersonal or mechanistic,
but rather was necessarily infected by the judges’
personal values.”2
Many more such quotes can be offered, but that is unnecessary. We all
know the story.
This ubiquitous formalist-realist narrative is not just a historical
story—it continues to structure contemporary debates and research on
judging. A 2007 article on judging co-authored by two law professors
and a federal judge begins:
How do judges judge? . . . According to the formalists,
judges apply the governing law to the facts of a case in a
logical, mechanical, and deliberative way. For the
formalists, the judicial system is a “giant syllogism
machine,” and the judge acts like a “highly skilled
mechanic.” Legal realism, on the other hand, represents
a sharp contrast . . . . For the realists, the judge “decides
by feeling, and not by judgment; by ‘hunching’ and not
by ratiocination” and later uses deliberative faculties
“not only to justify that intuition to himself, but to make
it pass muster.”3
Judge Richard Posner’s recent summary on judging, How Judges Think, is
pitched as an assault against the delusions of legal formalism that still
beguile the legal fraternity.4 Well over a hundred quantitative studies of
judging have been conducted by political scientists, with reams more
currently underway, many aiming to prove that formalism is wrong and

WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE 187
(1988).
3
Chris Guthrie, et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 2 (2007).
4
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008).
2
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realism is correct.5 Legal academics are busily developing “new legal
formalism” or “new legal realism.”6 The entire legal culture has been
indoctrinated in the formalist-realist divide.
The pervasive influence this story exercises on contemporary
thought about judging is all the more extraordinary when one realizes
that the formalist-realist divide is fundamentally wrong. The story about
the legal formalists is largely an invention. Legal realism is substantially
misapprehended.7 Quantitative studies of judging are marked by a
distorting slant owing to incorrect beliefs about the formalists and
realists.8 Debates about judging are routinely framed in terms of
antithetical formalist-realist poles that jurists do not actually hold. We
must free ourselves from the formalist-realist stranglehold if we are to
recover a sound understanding of judging.
The first part of the argument dispels the story about the formalist
age. This is crucial because much of the distortion that follows can be
traced back to this misleading story. This Lecture demonstrates that
jurists held very realistic views of judging during the so-called formalist
age and explains how the story was constructed and when it took hold.
It turns out that the full blown account of formalism taken for granted
today was actually invented in the 1960s and 1970s owing to
contemporary concerns. After dispelling the story about the formalist
age, I will address its implications for conventional views about the
realists. Today the realists are viewed as skeptics of judging. But that is
a mistake: in fact they believed in the law and hoped to advance our
understanding of judging. The overarching objective of this Lecture is to
lay out what I call “balanced realism.” Most jurists, including the legal
realists, have perceived judging in balanced realist terms for more than a
century.
The next part of the argument jumps to the present, taking up the
contrast between contemporary formalists and realists. It shows that
leading legal formalists hold very realistic views of law, and that legal
realists accept the core elements of a formalistic view of law. There are
differences between these camps in tone and emphasis, but framing the
debate about judging in these terms is counter-productive and
encourages attacks on false targets.
5
Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Part to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis,
20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 (1999) (analyzing results of hundreds of separate empirical studies on
judging).
6
See e.g., David Charny, New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.842 (1999);
Howard Erlanger, et al., Is it Time For a New Legal Realism?,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 335 (2005).
7
See Brian Z. Tamanaha, Understanding Legal Realism, 87 TEX. L. REV. 731, 732 (2009).
8
See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Distorting Slant of Quantitative Studies of Judging, 50 B.C. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2009).
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II. THE REALISM OF THE “FORMALIST AGE”
By most accounts, the formalist age ran from the 1870s through the
1920s, when the legal realists emerged to break its spell. The problem
with this often repeated claim is that many very realistic things about
judging were uttered during this period. Consider this remarkably
realistic 1881 passage about judging:
It is useless for judges to quote a score of cases from the
digest to sustain almost every sentence, when every one
knows that another score might be collected to support
the opposite ruling. The perverse habit of qualifying
and distinguishing has been carried so far that all fixed
lines are obliterated, and a little ingenuity in stating the
facts of a case is enough to bring it under a rule that will
warrant the desired conclusion….[T]he most honest judge
knows that the authorities with which his opinions are
garnished often have had very little to do with the decision of
the court—perhaps have only been looked up after that
decision was reached upon the general equities of the
case….He writes, it may be, a beautiful essay upon the
law of the case, but the real grounds of decision lie
concealed under the statement of facts with which it is
prefaced. It is the power of stating the facts as he
himself views them which preserves the superficial
consistency and certainty of the law, and hides from
careless eyes its utter lack of definiteness and precision.9
William G. Hammond made these striking statements, as skeptical as
anything the legal realists would say five decades later, upon his
installation as the first full time Dean and Professor at St. Louis
University School of Law. He was not a legal radical. Hammond,
indeed, has been identified by legal historians as an important
contributor to legal formalism.10
Many similarly realistic observations can be found at the time. In
1887, for example, Columbia law professor Munroe Smith realistically
described the process by which judges transparently altered the law
while claiming to adhere to stare decisis:
9
W.G. Hammond, American Law Schools, Past and Future, 7 S. U. L. REV. 400, 412–13
(1881) (emphasis added).
10
See William P. LaPiana, Jurisprudence of History and Truth, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 519, 539–42,
555, 557 (1992); cf David M. Rabban, The Historiography of Late Nineteenth-Century American
Legal History, 4 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 541, 567–78 (2003).
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[W]hen new law is needed, the courts are obliged to
“find” it, and to find it in old cases. This can commonly
be done by re-examination and re-interpretation, or, at
the worst, by “distinction.” By a combination of these
means, it is even possible to abrogate an old rule and to
set a new one in its place. When the old rule is
sufficiently wormholed with “distinctions,” a very slight
re-examination will reduce it to dust, and a reinterpretation of the “distinguishing” cases will produce
the rule that is desired.11
Smith took the view, as did Holmes and the later legal realists, that law
is the product of contests over social and individual interests,12 and that
the essential purpose of law is to advance “‘public policy[.]’”13
A remarkably modern-sounding article was published by Walter
Coles in the leading American Law Review in 1893, “Politics and the
Supreme Court of the United States.” Coles examined a number of
important Supreme Court decisions of the past century, systematically
matching the political background of the justices with their decisions.
“Viewing the history of the Supreme Court at large, and stating
conclusions somewhat broadly, it may be said that its adjudications on
constitutional questions have in their general tendencies conformed, in a
greater or lesser degree, to the maxims and traditions of the political
party whose appointees have, for the time being, dominated the court.”14
He criticized several Supreme Court opinions as vague, “weak,
incoherent, and uncandid[,]”15 best explained not by the stated legal
reasoning but by the political views of the judges. “[T]o say that no
political prejudices have swayed the court,” noted Coles with
consummate realism, “is to maintain that its members have been exempt
from the known weaknesses of human nature, and above those
influences which operate most powerfully in determining the opinions
of other men.”16 Especially when no clear precedent exists, he asserted, a
judge’s “conclusions will be largely controlled by the influences,
opinions and prejudices to which he happens to have been subjected.”17

Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887).
Id. at 122–23.
13
Id. at 130.
14
Walter D. Coles, Politics and the Supreme Court of the United States, 27 AM. L. REV. 182,
207 (1893).
15
Id. at 205
16
Id. at 182.
17
Id. at 190.
11
12
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In the 1904 Yale Law Journal, Wilbur Larremore argued that state high
court judges were rendering decisions that were “sympathetic with and
effectuating an extra-judicial sentiment.”18 Larremore observed:
In this condition of affairs judges indulge the
delusion that they are observing stare decisis merely
because they cite precedents. The truth is that, much in
the same manner that expert witnesses are procurable to
give almost any opinions that are desired, judicial
precedents may be found for any proposition that a counsel, or
a court, wishes established, or to establish. We are not living
under a system of scientific exposition and development
of abstract principles, but, to a large degree, under one
of judicial arbitration, in which the courts do what they
think is just in the case at bar and cite the nearest favorable
previous decisions as pretexts[.]19
It must be emphasized that none of the jurists quoted were radicals;
all were known legal figures in their day; and what they said was not
unusual. What prompted many of these expressions of realism was
concern about the worrisome uncertainty of the law, a common theme
among jurists at the time. This uncertainty was the product of two main
factors.
First, the West Publishing Company had begun to
indiscriminately publish decisions, which produced proliferation of
inconsistent precedents. Second, an explosion of legislation was taking
place over a range of topics, mainly at the state level, but also at the
federal level. The combination of these two factors led many jurists to
bewail the messy state of the law. Judge John Dillon, one of the nation’s
most renowned judges, summed up the situation in the following
passage, written in 1886.
Thousands of decisions are reported every year. An
almost unlimited number can be found upon almost any
subject. What any given case decides, must be deduced
from a careful examination of the exact facts, and of the
positive legislation, if any, applicable thereto. A general
principle will be found adjudged by certain courts.
Other courts deny or doubt the soundness of the
principle.
Exceptions are gradually but certainly
introduced. Almost every subject is overrun by a more

18
19
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than tropical redundancy of decisions, leaving the most
patient investigator entangled in doubt.20
This luxuriant muddle was made worse, Dillon added, because
legislation was “irregular and fragmentary,” and often poorly drafted.21
Dillon’s observations are especially telling because, like Hammond, he
has been identified by modern formalists as a leading contributor to legal
formalism.22
Many more realistic depictions of the law from the period can be
offered. Here is a final example, written in 1907 by a leading
commentator, James Bryce:
The Common Law is admittedly unsymmetrical. Some
people might call it confused, however exact may be the
propositions that compose it.
There are general
principles running thought it, but these are often hard to
follow, so numerous are the exceptions. There are
inconsistencies in the Common Law, where decisions
have been given at different times and have not been
settled by the highest Court of Appeal or by the
Legislature. There are gaps in it. Thus there has been
formed a tendency among lawyers to rate principles, or,
at any rate, let us say, philosophical and logical views of
the law, very low compared with any positive
declaration made by a court.23
III. THE INVENTION OF THE FORMALIST AGE: POUND’S CONTRIBUTION
How did the erroneous story about the “formalist age” get going?
The argument can only be sketched here. Three generations contributed
to the creation of this story: Roscoe Pound, Jerome Frank and the legal
realists, and leftist historians and theorists in the 1970s. All played
pivotal roles in establishing and spreading the story. These successive
contributors had their own distinctive motivations and concerns, but
they all were critical of courts of the day and all were progressives or on
the left.
The seminal piece in the construction of this image was laid by
Roscoe Pound, notably his 1908 Columbia Law Review article,
John F. Dillon, Codification, 20 AM. L. REV. 29, 36 (1886) .
Id.
22
See LaPiana, supra note 10.
23
James Bryce, The Influence of National Character and Historical Environment on the
Development of the Common Law, 19 GREEN BAG 569, 571 (1907).
20
21
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“Mechanical Jurisprudence.” Pound began the article by posing the
question: “What is scientific law?”24 His answer: “the marks of a
scientific law are, conformity to reason, uniformity, and certainty.
Scientific law is a reasoned body of principles for the administration of
justice, and its antithesis is a system of enforcing magisterial caprice,
however honest, and however much disguised under the name of justice
or equity or natural law.”25 The danger of scientific law, Pound warned,
is a “petrification,” which “tends to cut off individual initiative in the
future, to stifle independent consideration of new problems and of new
phases of old problems, and so to impose the ideas of one generation
upon another.”26 Contemporary U.S. law, Pound claimed, was mired in
this state:
[T]he jurisprudence of conceptions tends to decay.
Conceptions are fixed. The premises are no longer to be
examined. Everything is reduced to simple deduction
from them. Principles cease to have importance. The
law becomes a body of rules. This is the condition
against which sociologists now protest, and protest
rightly.27
He argued that historical jurisprudence and analytical jurisprudence, the
main legal theories of the day, exacerbated this stultification because
they emphasized abstract concepts and logical analysis.28 Pound
proposed that legislation should be enacted to meet the needs of the day,
to form a more current basis upon which the common law could develop
anew.
By framing his criticism in these terms, Pound was able to tread a
line that was critical of the state of the law but not in a way that
challenged the integrity of judges. On the left flank, many progressive
critics at the time excoriated judges for doing the bidding of the elite
capitalist class.29 Pound’s criticism was more measured. His argument
was that the judges were rendering legal decisions in good faith;
unfortunately, rapid changes in surrounding social and economic
conditions meant that purely logical decisions based upon preexisting
law produced results that were out of sync with modern circumstances.
Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 605 (1908).
Id.
26
Id. at 606.
27
Id. at 611–12.
28
Id. at 607–13.
29
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE REALIST-FORMALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING 27–43, 67–90 (2010).
24
25
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Pound repeated this characterization many times over the ensuing
decades. He insisted in 1913, for example, that “the lawyer believes that
the principles of law are absolute, eternal, and of universal validity, and
that law is found, not made[.]”30 Pound would go on to become the
long-serving Dean of Harvard Law School as well as the leading
jurisprudence scholar of his generation. This combination of repetition
and reputation effectively cemented the image of the time.
The above quotes by Hammond, Dillon, Larremore, and Bryce,
however, reveal that Pound’s portrayal must be regarded with
skepticism. Owing to the existence of gaps in the law and inconsistent
precedents, judging was far from mechanical, according to their
accounts. Many nineteenth century jurists openly declared that the old
common law saying that law was “found by judges, not made” was a
fiction, recognized as such by everyone. A lawyer wrote in 1871,
“[t]hough the rules of the judge-made law are enacted for the cases as
they occur, the fiction is that they have existed from of old and are not
enacted but declared.”31 Another lawyer wrote in 1883 that “we all know
this is one of the resplendent fictions . . . .”32 Columbia law professor
Munroe Smith observed in 1887 that “[n]obody really believes in the fiction[]
[that the courts do not make law].”33 Another commentator in 1888:
“[b]y a singular fiction the courts, from time immemorial, have
pretended that they simply declared the law, and did not make the law;
yet we all know that this pretense is a mere fiction[.]”34
If most jurists of the day indeed believed in the full blown formalist
image, one would expect to find clear and confident statements of the
full blown formalist position by its proponents—but none are on hand.
When setting out his portrayal, Pound made repeated references to
German jurists discussing German legal science.35 German legal science
did indeed describe law and judging in terms that resembled the image
of legal formalism. Ironically, however, as Max Weber made clear at the
time, the rationally organized civil law systems stood in stark contrast to
30
Roscoe Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361,375 (emphasis added);
ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 110–11 (1938).
31
Edward M. Doe, Codification, 5 WESTERN JURIST 289, 289–90 (1871) (emphasis added).
32
John M. Shirley, The Future of Our Profession, in REPORT OF THE SIXTH ANNUAL
MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION 211 (1883).
33
Munroe Smith, State Statute and Common Law, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 105, 121 (1887) (emphasis
added).
34
Editors, Current Topics, 29 ALBANY L. J. 481, 481 (1884) (quoting a Mr. Seymour)
(emphasis added).
35
See e.g. Pound, supra note 24 Mechanical Jurisprudence, at 606 n.6, 607 n.9. It should
also be noted that the protests of American sociologists Pound avers to in the final sentence
is a lament in a three page book review about the invalidation of laws by courts that cite
old precedents. C.H. Henderson, Reviews, 11 AM. J. SOC. 846, 847 (1906).
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common law systems, which Weber characterized as almost the opposite
of formally rational legal systems.36
It is also telling to compare what Pound wrote in 1908 with the
assertions of Edwin Corwin the following year. Corwin was an eminent
political scientist and perhaps the leading constitutional law scholar of
the day. He remarked in 1909:
It was formerly the wont of legal writers to regard court
decisions in much the same way as the mathematician
regards the x of an algebraic equation: given the facts of
the case and the existing law, the outcome was
inevitable. This unhistorical standpoint has now been
largely abandoned. Not only is it admitted that judges in
finding the law act not as automata, as mere adding
machines, but creatively, but also that the considerations
which determine their decisions, far from resting
exclusively upon a narrowly syllogistic basis, often
repose very immediately upon concrete and vital
notions of what is desirable and useful.37
A year after Pound claimed in “Mechanical Jurisprudence” that judges
reasoned in mechanical terms, Corwin called these ideas obsolete.38
Additional reasons to be skeptical of Pound’s account are his pivotal
references to legal science and abstract jurisprudential theories.
Nineteenth century legal academics were enamored with the idea that
law was a science, for that accorded it prestige worthy of a place in
university studies. Throughout the so-called formalist age, however,
legal practitioners were openly skeptical of this way of viewing law. In
1874, the lawyer-editors of the Albany Law Journal identified this gap
between theorists and practitioners: “[t]his view [that law is a science] is
now taken by all theoretical legists; but it has not come down to the
professional level, and for the most part, the jurist and the practitioner
do not stop to inquire whether their system is a science . . . .”39 Henry
White, a member of the bar, wrote in the Yale Law Journal in 1892:
If the law were an exact science and furnished a
complete system of rules which could be applied
MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 656–58, 784–808, 852–59, 889–92 (Guenther Roth
& Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
37
Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment, 7 MICH. L. REV.
643, 643 (1909) (emphasis added).
38
Id. at 659–72.
39
Editors, Is the Law a Philosophy, a Science, or an Art?, 10 ALBANY L. REV. 371, 371 (1874).
36
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without serious difficulty and with certain results in
every case, perhaps it would be better not to look
beyond the written law in determining controversies.
But . . . most cases of any difficulty present questions of
law on which no one can confidently predict the
decision. Most important battles in the courts, which do
not turn on questions of fact, are fought on the frontier
of the law, where the ground is unsettled, and where
new rules are being formulated and new precedents
made.40
An academic in 1895 acknowledged the gaping divide between
theoretically-inclined academics and practitioners on this issue:
Much debate has been expended on this question[: is
law a science?] The assertion that it is, by jurists having
high ideals, has provoked no little repugnance among
practical lawyers, who see that their whole work is
really to produce a mental result in the minds of men—
judges and jurors—who are influenced by mixed
motives, interest, sympathy, antipathy, prejudice,
passion; and that scientific accuracy does not cut much
figure to their view, in the process, nor in the result.”41
Consider, finally, the observations of Jabez Fox, the author of several
turn-of-the-century commentaries in the Harvard Law Review giving, as it
were, the view from practice. “If you ask a lawyer whether he really
believes that judicial decisions are mathematical deductions,” Fox wrote
in 1901, “he will say that the notion is absurd; that when four judges vote
one way and three another, it does not mean that the three or the four
have made a mistake in addition or subtraction. It means simply that the
different judges have given different weights to divers competing
considerations which cannot be balanced on any measured scale.”42 Fox
added that although judges must follow precedent that cannot be
distinguished on some rational ground, “Beyond this the judge has a free
hand to decide the case before him according to his view of the general
good . . . [and] no human being can tell how the social standard of justice
will work on that judge’s mind before the judgment is rendered.”43

40
41
42
43

Henry C. White, Three Views of Practice, 2 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1892).
Editors, Is Law a Science?, 2 UNIV. L. REV. 257, 257 (1895).
Jabez Fox, Law and Logic, 14 HARV. L. REV. 39–42 (1900).
Id. at 43.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 9

1254 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

Pound’s account of prevailing beliefs in mechanical jurisprudence
does not stand up to scrutiny. His observations did not comport with
what others were saying at the time. The vision of law and judging he
described did not match the concerns expressed by many jurists of the
great uncertainty of the law and the freedom judges had to rule
whichever way they desired. He relied heavily on German legal science.
His depiction was dominated by jurisprudential theories which
practitioners did not take seriously. Nonetheless, later generations
uncritically accepted Pound’s unreliable portrayal of mechanical
jurisprudence, using his account as the foundation stone of the story
about the formalist age.
IV. THE MODERN INVENTION OF THE FORMALIST AGE: BORN IN THE
TURMOIL OF THE 1960S AND 1970S
Although it seems much older, the “formalist age” first burst on the
legal scene in the 1970s. No one at the turn of the nineteenth century
called themselves formalists, which was a pejorative term. Neither
Holmes, nor Pound, nor Frank attached the label “formalists” or
“formalism” to a prevailing theory or style of judging. Rather, they
spoke in terms of legal science, logical deduction, and mechanistic
reasoning. Llewellyn discussed the “formal style” in a 1942 essay,44
although no one picked up the reference. Llewellyn again referred to the
“Formal Style” in The Common Law Tradition.45 Still the label remained
fallow. Grant Gilmore published an article about the legal realists in
1961 without mentioning “formalism” or “the formalists,” instead
referring to “conceptualism” and the “predecessors[]” of the realists.46
As late as 1968, a book on American Legal Realism also failed to use the
label.47
Almost without warning, the mid-1970s brought a cluster of articles
on legal formalism by prominent legal historians and legal theorists.48
Gilmore’s celebrated Ages of American Law, published in 1977, cemented
Karl Llewellyn, On the Good, The True, The Beautiful in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224 (1942).
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 53 (1960).
46
Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: It’s Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038 (1961).
47
WILFRID E. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM SKEPTICISM, REFORM, AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS (1968).
48
In two superb works on legal realism, published in 1969 and 1973, Edward Purcell
used the term “legalistic formalism” to describe reasoning at the time. Purcell had read
White’s book, and takes up similar themes relating to the influence of pragmatism on
American thought. See Edward Purcell, American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal
Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 424 (1969); EDWARD A.
PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM
OF VALUE (1973).
44
45

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/9

Tamanaha: Balanced Realism on Judging

2010]

Balanced Realism on Judging

1255

the modern image of the formalist age; an advance synopsis was
published in the 1975 Yale Law Journal.49 Morton Horwitz published
“The Rise of Legal Formalism,” also in 1975, in the American Journal of
Legal History.50 Duncan Kennedy published a theoretical analysis
entitled “Legal Formality” in the 1973 volume of the Journal of Legal
Studies.51 William Nelson extensively elaborated on the rise of legal
formalism in connection with anti-slavery cases in a 1974 article in the
Harvard Law Review.52 Legal formalism was a central theme in Justice
Accused, Robert Cover’s book on the judicial treatment of slavery cases.53
All of these scholars worked at elite law schools (Harvard, Yale, and
Pennsylvania), and all were politically on the left. Kennedy and Horwitz
were founding members of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, which
engaged in a radical critique of liberal legalism.
There is unquestionably a connection between this sudden
convergence of critical attention on legal formalism and the searing
political events of the 1960s and 1970s, when universities and law
schools were wracked by civil rights and anti-war protests. Among the
left, it was a time of seething skepticism about law.54 The student editors
of the Harvard Law Review wrote in 1970 that “[i]t is true that what passes
for logic in some judicial opinions (and in many Harvard classrooms) is a
little more than finely spun sophistry. It is also important to note that
pure logic does not offer a solution to all [legal] problems.”55 Little
imagination is required to see the parallels between these attitudes and
the shortly forthcoming preoccupation of critical theorists with legal
formalism. Cover drew the link in his Acknowledgements, writing that
his book was inspired by a comparison of “judicial complicity in the
crimes of Vietnam” with “judicial acquiescence in the injustices of Negro
slavery.”56 In the closing chapter of Ages of American Law, Gilmore
argued that the 1970s were ushering in a “New Conceptualism”
Grant Gilmore, The Age of Anxiety, 84 YALE L.J. 1022 (1975).
Horwitz, “The Rise of Legal Formalism,” supra.
51
Duncan Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973). Although circulated
among historians and theorists at the time, Duncan Kennedy’s influential book on this
topic was not published until 2006. DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL
LEGAL THOUGHT (2006); a piece of this was published at the time in Duncan Kennedy,
Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: the Case of Classical Legal Thought in
America, 1850–1940, 3 RES. IN LAW AND SOC. 3 (1980).
52
William E. Nelson, The Impact of The Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974).
53
ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1975).
54
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW ch.6
(2006).
55
Editors, With the Editors, 83 HARV. L. REV. at xxxi (1970).
56
Id. at xi.
49
50
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resembling that of the formalist age. “In our own history, both in the late
nineteenth century and in our own time,” he wrote, “the components of
the formalist approach have included the search for theoretical formulas
assumed to be of universal validity and the insistence that all particular
instances should be analyzed and dealt with in the light of the overall
theoretical structure.”57
A group of leftist scholars deeply disaffected at the law in the 1970s
thus reached back to the work of the previous episodes of disaffection
(Pound, the legal realists) to resurrect a portrait of what was perceived to
be a common enemy. Once given a name, the notion of legal formalism
and beliefs about “the formalists” swept the legal culture, rapidly
ensconcing the now ubiquitous formalist-realist divide.
Coming
packaged in an antithesis with the already familiar legal realists made a
handy pairing, easy to understand, after which each pole came to define
its opposite.
With evident pride of achievement, Gilmore declared in 1979 that
the previous two decades of historical research “has produced one
proposition, which, so far as I know, had never been heard of before
World War II, but which has, with extraordinary speed, become one of
the received ideas of the 1970’s. That is the proposition that the fifty year
period from the Civil War to World War I was one of legal formalism.”58
Concrete evidence supports his boast. Prior to 1968, no article (zero)
was published in a law journal with “formalism” or “formalist” in the
title.59 The first article title to include one of these terms was written by
Grant Gilmore in 1968.60 From 1968 through 1979, nine articles had one
of these terms in the title; from 1980 through 1989 there were twentyseven such articles; from 1990 though 1999 there were sixty-eight such
articles; from 2000 through 2007 there were forty-eight.61 As these
numbers suggest, the notion of the formalist age, although it built upon
and incorporated earlier accounts, is indeed a modern invention.
A few legal historians and legal theorists expressed reservations
about hopping on this bandwagon. “’Formalism is hard to measure;”
GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 108 (1977).
Grant Gilmore, Formalism and the Law of Negotiable Instruments, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV.
441 (1979) (emphasis added).
59
An article with “formalism” in the title was published in 1934, but this is not counted
because the term was invoked in a casual sense by way of contrast to “informal.” Arthur E.
Morgan, Vitality and Formalism in Government, 13 SOCIAL FORCES 1 (1934).
60
Grant Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism, and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REV. 659 (1968).
61
A partial explanation for the increased quantity might be the growth in the number of
journals, but a comparison suggests that this does not explain the entire increase. Articles
with “legal positivism” (a leading contemporary theory of law) in the title go up only a bit
over this period: four from 1968–1979; ten from 1980–89; twelve from 1990–1999; eleven
from 2000–2007.
57
58
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wrote Lawrence Friedman, “and there is always a nagging doubt
whether or not this is a useful way to characterize the work of the
judges.”62 Legal theorist H.L.A. Hart suggested that the term formalism
was a confusing “misnomer,” a term of reproach rather than a useful or
clear idea.63 Nonetheless, the label and image stuck.
Among legal historians, legal theorists, and political scientists, with
few exceptions,64 the story about the formalist age quickly became
gospel, and everyone else in the legal culture, taking the word of the
experts, joined along. Political scientists incorporated the notion of
formalism into the models of judging.65 Legal theorists set out to fill in
the notion of legal formalism with theoretical content.
A warning sign that the story should be regarded skeptically is that
the formalists have been defined entirely by political critics of courts and
jurists. The suspicion that politics is what drives charges of “formalism”
is heightened when one recognizes that the jurists most often
condemned as formalists were usually conservatives of some stripe, as is
evident in this string of names offered by historian Thomas Grey: “from
the formalism of Cooley and Langdell to the formalism of Friedrich A.
Hayek and Antonin Scalia.”66 Any jurist with politically conservative
views who believes in liberty or in fidelity to legal rules is a prime
candidate for being branded a formalist. For a loose analogy, it is akin to
relying entirely upon the writings of Marxists to learn about Liberalism,
or vice versa—although this analogy misleads because these political
theories represent a discernable cluster of ideas, while “formalism”
appears to be largely a patched-together invention.
Another problem with the standard story about the formalists is that
the notions that the common law is autonomous, comprehensive, and
logically ordered, and that judging involves mechanical deduction, strike

62
Friedman, A History of American Law, supra 623 n.39.. Raising another set of doubts
about the image of the formalist age, Susanna Blumenthal published a superb historical
study that argues that throughout the nineteenth century the creative aspects of judging
were well understood. Blumenthal, “Law and the Creative Mind,” supra.
63
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 610
(1957).
64
One exception among legal theorists is Anthony Sebok, who raised doubts in his book
Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence, supra, Chap. 3. Historian Robert Gordon has also
expressed various doubts about the story about the legal formalists, see Gordon, “The
Elusive Transformation,” supra; Gordon, “Book Review,” supra. A new generation of
historians has begun to challenge various aspects of the story. Bruce Kimball has contested
the formalist image of Langdell, as mentioned earlier. Lewis Grossman challenges the
portrayal of James Carter in Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the AntiClassical Jurisprudence of Anticodification, 19 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 149 (2007).
65
See Tamanaha, supra note 8.
66
See Thomas C. Grey, Modern American Legal Thought, 106 YALE L.J. 493, 512 (1996).
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modern ears as far-fetched. This reaction should have set off alarms
among theorists and historians. Jurists a century ago, after all, must
have been intimately familiar with all the problems thrown up by human
judges working with an imperfect system of law. And indeed they were.
V. BALANCED REALISM
If realistic views of law and judging circulated throughout the
formalist age, it stands to reason that the legal realists could not be the
pioneering radicals about judging they are often portrayed as today.
More to the point, with respect to their views of judging, they were not
radicals at all. The legal realists adhered to what I call “balanced
realism.” The full argument is laid out elsewhere,67 so only a brief sketch
will be provided here.
Balanced realism has two conjoined aspects—a skeptical aspect and
a rule-bound aspect. It refers to an awareness of the flaws, limitations,
and openness of law, and an awareness that judges sometimes make
choices, that they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and that
they sometimes are influenced by their political views and personal
biases (the skeptical aspect). These skeptical aspects are inherent to law
and judging and cannot be eliminated. Law is stated in general terms in
advance and does not always have precise or singular meaning in every
context of application. Not every situation can be anticipated in
advance; legal rules can be over- and under-inclusive in ways that are
not always consistent with their purposes; law is not always systematic;
and there is a margin of indeterminacy in language and rules; and judges
are human decision-makers subject to cognitive biases, passions,
prejudices, and occasions of poor judgment.
But this skeptical awareness is conditioned by the understanding
that legal rules nonetheless work. In a well-functioning legal system,
judges largely abide by and apply the law, there are practice-related,
social and institutional factors that constrain judges, and judges render
generally predictable decisions consistent with the law (the rule-bound
aspect). The rule-bound aspect of judging can function reliably
notwithstanding the challenges presented by the skepticism-inducing
aspect, although this is an achievement that must be earned, is never
perfectly achieved, and is never guaranteed.
A concise statement of balanced realism was set forth by Cardozo:
Those, I think, are the conclusions to which a sense of
realism must lead us. No doubt there is a field within
67
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which judicial judgment moves untrammeled by fixed
principles. Obscurity of statute or of precedent or of
customs or of morals, or collision between some or all of
them, may leave the law unsettled, and cast a duty upon
the courts to declare it retrospectively in the exercise of a
power frankly legislative in function. In such cases, all
that the parties to the controversy can do is to forecast
the declaration of the rule as best they can, and govern
themselves accordingly.
We must not let these
occasional and relatively rare instances blind our eyes to
the innumerable instances where there is neither
obscurity nor collision nor opportunity for diverse
judgment.68
Contrary to their image as skeptics, the legal realists viewed judging
in similarly balanced terms. They did not assert that judges routinely
manipulated the law to produce desired outcomes.69 Their most
intemperate rhetoric—especially from Jerome Frank—gestured in this
direction, but that was not their considered position. Karl Llewellyn,
perhaps the best known legal realist (along with Frank), always
expressed balanced realism, as reflected in this passage from the Bramble
Bush:
[W]hile it is possible to build a number of divergent
logical ladders up out of the same cases and down again
to the same dispute, there are not so many that can be built
defensibly. And of these few there are some, or there is
one, toward which the prior cases pretty definitely press.
Already you see the walls closing in around the judge.70
A skilled lawyer asked to predict the fate of a case on appeal,
Llewellyn conjectured, ought “to average correct prediction of outcome
eight times out of ten, and better than that if he knows the appeal
counsel on both sides or sees the briefs.”71 When identifying the sources
of this high degree of reckonability, Llewellyn elaborated on several
“steadying factors”: judges are indoctrinated into the legal tradition
such that they “see things . . . through law spectacles”;72 much legal
doctrine—including rules, principles, and statutes—is reasonably clear
68
69
70
71
72

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 128–29 (1921).
See Tamanaha, supra note 8.
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 70 (1960).
LLEWELLYN, supra note 45.
Id. at 19–20.
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and well developed;73 judges follow accepted doctrinal techniques, strive
to produce a just result, and strive to come up with the right legal
answer;74 judges sitting together on an appellate bench interact “to
smooth the unevenness of individual temper”;75 and judges’ desire and
commitment to live up to the obligations of the judicial role, to earn the
approval of their legal audience for appropriate judicial behavior, and
their desire to avoid reversal by a higher court, prompts judges to
engage in a good faith effort to conduct an unbiased search for the
correct legal result.76
The misleading skeptical image of the realists is perpetuated by the
formalist-realist antithesis, which casts the realists as the opposite pole of
formalism. Llewellyn devoted a 500 page book, The Common Law
Tradition, to refuting the “Law School Skeptic,”77 arguing at length that
judicial decisions are highly predictable and determined mainly by legal
factors.78 Llewellyn wrote the book precisely to counteract the corrosive
consequences of facile skepticism about judging—which is ironic
because today he is often painted as a skeptic. 79
VI. THE REALISM OF CONTEMPORARY FORMALISTS
The false formalist-realist divide continues to structure
contemporary debates about judging. What this obscures is that all sides
in the debate share substantial common ground. They share balanced
realism.
Let us begin with the realism of contemporary formalists. A number
of prominent judges and legal theorists, including Justice Antonin Scalia,
Judge Frank Easterbrook, Professor John Manning of Columbia, and
Professor Lawrence Solum of Illinois, among others, self-identify or are
tagged as modern day formalists. The argument here is not that these
jurists are espousing empty or irrelevant ideas; rather, the argument is
that labeling their position “formalist” adds nothing distinctive,80 and is
potentially misleading because these modern formalists accept the basic
insights identified with realism.

Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21–25.
75
Id. at 26.
76
Id. at 45–51.
77
LLEWELLYN, supra note 45.
78
Id. at 3–7, 19–35.
79
Id. at 3.
80
Although Scalia and Easterbrook have been labeled formalists by others, neither
identify themselves as “formalists.”
73
74
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Scalia is thought to be a contemporary formalist. His basic position
is that constitutional provisions and statutes should be interpreted in
accordance with the meaning of their terms, informed by original
understandings. His adoption of this interpretive approach does not
mean that Scalia is unrealistic about law or judging. With respect to the
common law, Scalia states unabashedly that judges “make the law,”
resolving policy issues in the process.81 “Indeed, it is probably true that
in these fields judicial lawmaking can be more freewheeling than ever,”
Scalia writes, “since the doctrine of stare decisis has appreciably
eroded.”82 Scalia describes judges in common law cases not as
mechanically applying the law, but as seeking “the most desirable
resolution of [the] case.”83 He regrets the use of broad standards and
“totality of circumstances” and “balancing” tests on grounds that they
grant too much discretion to judges and increase legal uncertainty.84 But
Scalia recognizes that open provisions have advantages, and he accepts
that these “modes of analysis [will be] with us forever.”85
Judge Easterbrook, also identified as a formalist, emphasizes that
“‘Plain meaning’ as a way to understand language is silly. In interesting
cases, meaning is not ‘plain’ . . . . Hard questions have no right answers. Let
us not pretend that texts answer every question. Instead we must admit
that there are gaps in statutes, as in the law in general.”86 Easterbrook
recognizes, moreover, that social meanings and purposes necessarily
play into interpretation. “Words take their meaning from contexts, of
which there are many—other words, social and linguistic conventions,
the problems the authors were addressing. Texts appeal to communities
of listeners, and we use them purposively.”87
A vocal proponent of a “formalistic” approach to statutory
interpretation, John Manning, offers a series of similarly realistic
assertions: “modern formalists do not rely much on the-law-is-the-law
styles of argument”;88 “modern formalists recognize that language is a
social enterprise that yields meaning only in context. Hence, they
routinely derive statutory meanings from extratextual sources, including
ANTONIN SCALIA, COMMON LAW COURTS IN A CIVIL LAW SYSTEM: THE ROLE OF UNITED
STATES FEDERAL COURTS IN INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION AND LAW, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION 6, 9, 12 (Amy Gutman, ed., 1997).
82
Id. at 12.
83
Id. at 13.
84
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
85
Id. at 1187.
86
Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 67–68 (1994).
87
Id. at 61.
88
John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Statutory Formalism, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
685, 685 (1999).
81
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unenacted materials such as cases or treatises that define terms of art or
prescribe canons of construction.”89 “Modern formalists acknowledge
that all texts require exposition when applied to specific factual
situations, and hence that agencies and courts inevitably enjoy some
delegated authority to specify the details of statutory meaning.”90
“Formalist judges routinely use purpose to resolve ambiguity.”91
“If . . . judges must inevitably fill in the blanks of statutory construction,”
Manning asserts, “it does little violence to formalism to suggest that they
design the resulting norms to fit sensibly within the web of structural
relationships that the Constitution prescribes.”92
A sophisticated proponent of a formalistic approach to constitutional
interpretation, Lawrence Solum, also stakes out a thoroughly realistic
position: “Formalism requires rule-following[] . . . . But rule-following
need not be mechanical in any literal sense of that word. The application
of rules to particular facts may require sensitivity to context and
purpose[] . . . . Formalists can take the purposes of rules into account in
a variety of ways. . . .”93 “[T]here is no reason for formalism to reject a
practice of equity that refuses to apply a legal rule when it would lead to
absurd consequences.”94
“Formalism can and should accept the
proposition that more than one outcome in a case can be legally correct.
And formalism can and should accept the notion that the law sometimes
confers discretionary authority on legal actors, including judges.”95 “The
application of rules to particular situations necessarily involves practical
judgment, and legal formalism does not seek to deny this.”96
In the face of this considerable realism, one might ask, what is it
about their position that makes contemporary formalists distinctively
“formalistic”? Solum encapsulates it as follows: “[t]he core idea of
formalism is that the law (constitutions, statutes, regulations, and
precedent) provides rules and that these rules can, do, and should
provide a public standard for what is lawful (or not).”97 Beyond this
general position, “formalists” focus on different aspects and do not all
agree among themselves (Solum and Scalia, for example, although both

Id. at 688 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 688–89.
91
Id. at 693.
92
Id.
93
Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155,171–72 (2006).
94
Id. at 173.
95
Id. at 174.
96
Id. at 175.
97
Id. at 169–70.
89
90
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espouse versions of originalism, go in markedly different directions in
constitutional interpretation).
It seems reasonable to conjecture that most contemporary lawyers,
academics, and judges would sign on to the “core idea of formalism”
Solum identifies. Indeed, the legal system would be dysfunctional if
most lawyers and judges did not believe that legal rules provide guiding
and binding public standards. If that is correct, then most contemporary
lawyers can be regarded as “formalists” in a core sense (regardless of
whether they are repelled by the label).
VII. THE FORMALISM OF CONTEMPORARY REALISTS
Now let us see the formalism of contemporary realists. The most
prominent realist about judging today is Judge Richard Posner. His How
Judges Think is a sustained critique of the delusions of formalism. Posner
substitutes “legalism” for the term formalism because “it carries less
baggage,”98 but the meaning remains unchanged.
Legalists decide cases by applying preexisting rules or,
in some versions of legalism, by employing allegedly
distinctive modes of legal reasoning, such as “legal
reasoning by analogy.” They do not legislate, do not
exercise discretion other than in ministerial matters
(such as scheduling), have no truck with policy, and do
not look outside conventional legal texts—mainly
statutes, constitutional provisions, and precedents
(authoritative judicial decisions)—for guidance in
deciding new cases. For legalists, the law is an
autonomous domain of knowledge and technique.99
Throughout his book the deluded legalist serves as the foil for
Posner’s pragmatic view of judging.100 He charges that law professors
are the primary purveyors of a naïve legalist/formalist understanding of

98
POSNER, supra note 4, at 7. For another recent attack against formalism by a judge, see
E.W. THOMAS, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS: REALISM, PRAGMATISM, PRACTICAL REASONING AND
PRINCIPLES xix (2005) (“It is the lingering judicial commitment to formalism that explains
why so much judicial reasoning is still legalistic, strained, or mechanical.”.).
99
POSNER, supra note 4, at 7–8. There is no question that Posner means formalism when
he says legalism. At the end of this passage, Posner quotes a summary description of the
“legal formalists” by Thomas C. Grey, Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 473,478 (2003). In the index to his book, the “Formalism” entry says “See
Legalism.”
100
POSNER, supra note 4, ch. 1.
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judging.101 In law schools: “The motivations and constraints operating
on judges, and the judicial mentality that results, are ignored, as if judges
were computers rather than limited human intellects navigating seas of
uncertainty.”102 Legalism time and again is indicted by Posner for its
foolish illusions. “Legalism treats law as an autonomous discipline,”103
he repeats. Legalists believe that judging is purely a matter of
“performing logical operations.”104
The ideal legalist decision is the product of a syllogism
in which a rule of law supplies the major premise, the
facts of the case supply the minor one, and the decision
is the conclusion. The rule might have to be extracted
from a statute or a constitutional provision, but the
legalist model comes complete with a set of rules of
interpretation (the “canons of construction”), so that
interpretation too becomes a rule-bound activity,
purging judicial discretion. The legalist slogan is “the
rule of law.”105
The jurist Posner cites for that last delusion is Brian Tamanaha
(gulp).106 Without belaboring the issue, although I have criticized his
pragmatic judging,107 suffice it to say that I have never suggested the set
of positions Posner pins on legalists. None of the contemporary
formalists identified in the preceding Part adhere to this complex of
beliefs about law or judging—nor does any other jurist.
The upshot of these observations is not that Posner has constructed a
straw man. It is to demonstrate that the tale about classical legal
formalism continues to shape the debate over judging at the highest
level. Posner is one of the nation’s most influential judges as well as one
of the most respected legal theorists. What Posner says about judging
carries heft.
Not only does Posner resurrect classical legal formalists to serve as
his modern target, he also assumes a starkly realist stance. To less than

Id. ch. 8, especially 219–21.
Id. at 377.
103
Id. at 42.
104
Id.
105
Id. at 41.
106
At the end of the final sentence quoted, Poser cites my LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END:
THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW 227–31(2006), and Brian Z. Tamanaha, How an Instrumental
View of Law Corrodes the Rule of Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 469 (2007).
107
See TAMANAHA, supra note 55, ch. 13.
101
102
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careful readers, Posner will sound like a modern day Jerome Frank, the
most extreme realist.
Because the materials of legalist decision making fail to
generate acceptable answers to all the legal questions
that American judges are required to decide, judges
perforce have occasional—indeed rather frequent—
recourse to other sources of judgment, including their
own political opinions or policy judgments, even their
idiosyncrasies. As a result, law is shot through with politics
and with much else besides that does not fit a legalist
model of decision making.108
Judges are regularly confronted with open areas “in which the orthodox
(the legalist) methods of analysis yield unsatisfactory and sometimes no
conclusions, thereby allowing or even dictating that emotion,
personality, policy intuitions, ideology, politics, background, and
experience will determine a judge’s decision.”109
Posner bluntly
declares: “So judging is political.”110
Statements of this sort, scattered throughout the book, are like
tossing red meat at the eager skeptics of judging—as Posner well knows.
A political scientist reviewing the book enthused, with an air of
vindication, that “this book by a highly regarded sitting judge confirms
what social scientists . . . have demonstrated. Politics, ideology, and
strategic concerns infuse judicial decision-making.”111
Skeptics who take Posner’s bait, however, are falling for misdirection
from an inveterate provocateur. His position is not as radical as it
appears at first blush. Judges have admitted many times over in the past
hundred years that law runs out or supports contrary outcomes, and that
their personal views can play into legal interpretations.
Take his sampling of realistic statements uttered by judges who sat
with Cardozo eighty years ago. In a 1924 speech to the New York City
Bar, the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, Judge Frank Harris
Hiscock, reviewed a string of recent decisions and openly confided:
“[a]ll of these cases could have been decided the other way.”112 He told
his audience that constitutional questions about rights and liberties that
courts are called upon to decide are less questions of law than “of policy
POSNER, supra note 5, at 9 (emphasis added).
Id. at 11.
110
Id. at 369.
111
Mark Kessler, How Judges Think, LAW AND POLITICS BOOK REVIEW, Aug. 24, 2008,
http://www.bsos.umd.edu/gvpt/lpbr/reviews/2008/08/how-judges-think.html.
112
Frank Harris Hiscock, Progressiveness of New York Law, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 371, 376 (1924).
108
109
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and state craft.”113 Hence, rulings are a function of the “policy and
viewpoint of a court,” which can change when the membership
changes.114 Another judge on the court, Irving Lehman, delivered a
reflective speech at Cornell Law School in 1924 stating that judges are
sometimes confronted with conflicting precedents, or erroneous
precedents, or indeed no precedents, and they must sometimes change
the law for reasons of public policy.115 As a law student, he realized that
“[l]aw was not an exact science founded on immutable principles”; upon
becoming a judge, he “realized that in many cases there were no
premises from which any deductions could be drawn with logical
certainty.”116 He added that “no thoughtful judge can fail to note that in
conferences of the court, differences of opinion are based at least to some
extent upon differences of viewpoint[]”117; and “it is inevitable that a
judge in weighing individual rights as opposed to collective benefit will
to some extent be influenced by his personal views.”118 Judge Cuthbert
W. Pound, also on the court, elaborated on the sources of uncertainty in
law, observing that legal doctrines were “not infrequently reasoned
away to a vanishing point. One may wade through a morass of
decisions only to sink into a quicksand of uncertainty.”119
These are the candid admissions of a few judges on a single court in
the 1920s. Many judges have said the same in the decades before and
since.120 Judges also uniformly hasten to emphasize, however, that
notwithstanding the openness of law and the limitations of judges, their
decisions are substantially determined by the law. And Judge Posner is
no exception. After bluntly declaring (for maximum effect) that “judging
is political,” he soon tacks in the opposite direction:
But judging is not just personal and political. It is also
impersonal and nonpolitical in the sense that many,
indeed most, judicial decisions really are the product of a
neutral application of rules not made up for the occasion
to facts fairly found. Such decisions exemplify what is

Id. at 381.
Id. at 374.
115
Irving Lehman, The Influence of the Universities on Judicial Decisions, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 1
(1924).
116
Id. at 2–3.
117
Id. at 6.
118
Id. at 12.
119
Bulletin, Cuthbert W. Pound, Defective Law—Its Cause and Remedy, New York State Bar
Association, September 1929, 279, 281.
120
See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Realism of Judges Past and Present, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 77
(2009).
113
114

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/9

Tamanaha: Balanced Realism on Judging

2010]

Balanced Realism on Judging

1267

commonly called “legal formalism,” though the word I
prefer is “legalism.”121
Although easily overlooked beneath his blaring skeptical assertions,
Posner has consistently said this for many years: “the social interest in
certainty of legal obligation requires the judge to stick pretty close to
statutory text and judicial precedent in most cases and thus to behave,
much of the time anyway, as a formalist.”122 Posner often repeats that a
substantial proportion of time judges duly adhere to precedent because
that is what their role demands.123 “The business of judges is enforcing
the law,”124 Posner says, and that is what judges do.
Posner’s statements about politics and ideology relate to judging in
the “open area[,]”125 to the subset of cases with “legal uncertainty.”126
But “most cases are routine,”127 he tells us, and “the routine cases are
those that can be decided by legalist techniques.”128 Posner recognizes
that the vast bulk of disputes never make it into court because the
expected legal outcome is clear; a substantial majority of judicial
decisions are not appealed “because the case really is ‘controlled’ by
precedent or clear statutory language.”129 One must wonder why Judge
Posner thought it necessary to pitch the book as an assault against
prevailing legalist delusions when, by his own account, the legalist
position (the realistic one, not Posner’s resurrected classical formalist) is
not a delusion at all for the mass of routine cases.
Stripping away the rhetorical excesses, the differences between
Posner and his opponents play out on relatively narrow—albeit
important—terrain.
Legalists want judges to follow legal texts,
precedents, and methods as far as they will go.130 Posner similarly insists
that pragmatic judges usually do, and should, follow texts and
precedents when clear.131 Both sides agree that this covers the bulk of
cases.
Posner puts a different gloss on what comes to the same position.
Legalists say judges are obligated to follow the law; Posner says judges
should do what advances the social good, but he adds that society
121
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benefits from the consistent interpretation of the legal rules and
adherence to precedent. Legalists say judges have a duty to set forth a
reasoned, legally supported basis for their decision; with rascally delight,
Posner says those are the “rules of the judicial game,” 132 although he
admits that judges readily follow these rules and obtain satisfaction in
doing so.
When the law offers no clear answer or runs out—that is when matters
get tricky, for legalists and pragmatists alike. As Posner recognizes,
“[l]egalists acknowledge that their methods cannot close the deal every
time.”133 And “legalists” do not hold a uniform position on what a judge
should do when no legal answer can be ranked stronger than others. As
for his preferred method, Posner admits that pragmatism does not tell
judges how to figure out what are the “best” ends for the community.134
He also concedes that judges can only guess at the likely consequences of
their decisions.135 His final advice to a pragmatic judge offers scant
guidance: “there isn’t too much more to say to the would-be pragmatic
judge than make the most reasonable decision you can, all things
considered.”136 Individual pragmatic judges will have different views of
desirable social ends, and they will often lack reliable empirical
information to make informed judgments about what decision will best
advance those ends. The complexity and uncertainty involved in
predicting the future consequences of decisions are immense.
Opponents of pragmatic judging emphasize these flaws when objecting
that Posner’s preferred approach invites judges to engage in
uncontrolled political decision making, contrary to their judicial role, a
task for which they are ill-equipped.137
The core point of this discussion is that the disagreement between
Posner and his opponents mostly relates to the relatively small subset of
legally uncertain cases (the precise proportion unknown). This small
subset can never be eliminated because the law is unavoidably open and
uncertain at the margins. This involves the skeptical aspect of balanced
realism. There is no consensus answer for how judges should deal with
these situations because solid arguments—some normative, some
empirical—support competing approaches. For the bulk of cases,
however, there is substantial agreement about what judges are doing, as
well as agreement about what they should be doing (albeit with
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competing reasons proffered for why they should be doing it). This is
the rule-based aspect that balanced realism recognizes.
If taken at the broadest level of generality, a loose contrast can be
drawn between contemporary jurists identified as formalists and those
identified as realists: formalists tend to emphasize the reasons why and
ways in which legal rules, texts, and precedents can and should control;
realists tend to emphasize the limitations of legal rules. There are
differences of attitude and emphasis. But little more can be said beyond
that (and keep in mind that formalists disagree among themselves across
a range of issues, as do realists). The differences that separate formalists
and realists are neither sharp enough nor deep enough to maintain the
formalist-realist antithesis.
Neither side adopts the complex of
exaggerated beliefs typically associated with each pole.
VIII. A WAY OUT
If the preceding presentation has been at all persuasive, then the first
steps have already been taken to move beyond the formalist-realist
divide. By making it plain that the image of the formalist age deserves
skepticism, we are freed from one prong of the divide. The realization
that the realists were not radical skeptics, but held to a balanced realism
about judging, frees us from the other prong. The recognition that most
jurists, today and for more than a century, adhere to a balanced realism
about judging, provides a common baseline for debates about judging.
This “balanced realism” can with equal felicity be called “balanced
formalism.” Recognition of this common baseline will not in itself
resolve current debates. It does hold the promise, however, to reduce
misunderstandings and wasted effort, and to focus the debates on
matters of real disagreement. There have never been formalists who
believed that judging was an exercise in mechanical deductions; nor is it
plausible to believe that judges’ decisions are driven by their ideological
preferences. The sooner we set aside this false opposition the better off
we will be.
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